Espionage offences in the UK’s new National Security Act are so broadly defined that they “will result in cases of real harm” with people wrongly investigated, according to the first review of state threats legislation.
Jonathan Hall KC, an independent reviewer appointed by the home secretary, said the 2023 law had to be monitored against “misuse and overreach” because it could extend into politics, journalism, protest and other day-to-day activity.
“It is unavoidable that national security legislation hoists a flag for police involvement in broad reaches of human endeavour, with the risk of damaging mistakes by investigators and unjustified suspicion being cast on lawful activity,” Hall wrote in a report laid before parliament.
“Unless exceptionally well exercised, the UK’s novel and wide-ranging powers will result in cases of real harm where an individual is wrongly arrested or investigated, however well-intentioned,” he added.
The National Security Act was introduced to reform Britain’s outdated official secrets acts, the first of which dated back to 1911.
Archaic language and certain strict conditions had come to make prosecutions in certain spy cases impossible, including that of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry who were accused of spying for China.
Counter-terrorism police are currently engaged in a National Security Act investigation after Sheffield Hallam University complied with demands from Beijing to halt research by Prof Laura Murphy about human rights abuses in China.
Hall’s warning is that the change in the law has the potential to go far in the other direction, and he listed a series of examples where legitimate activity could be classed as espionage under the new law.
Police and prosecutors would have to exercise discretion in cases such as the potential impact of the new offence of foreign interference, which could affect “foreign policy work by thinktanks and journalists”, Hall said.
Foreign interference is a broadly drawn offence under the law and it could, Hall said, include “lobbying, electioneering, journalism, marketing campaigns, humanitarian aid, social media activity” if done with “the intention of benefiting a foreign power” so long as there was some misrepresentation or criminal conduct involved.
It could in theory affect individuals arguing for “arms to Ukraine/ Israel; foreign aid to Pakistan; rapprochement with Russia; more access to domestic markets for Chinese cotton” in the media or thinktanks or “foreign-funded NGOs or journalists who use deception (‘prohibited conduct’) to expose corrupt individuals”.
Though Hall said he was “reasonably confident” prosecutors would not want to push borderline cases before the courts, there remained a risk that “editors and trustees of newspapers and thinktanks … will be stalked by fear of national security offending, and trim their conduct accordingly”.
The lawyer also focused on one aspect of the act’s foreign power condition, where an offence can be theoretically committed without the individual accused having any contact with another country, aimed at people seeking to help a hostile state without it being aware of it.
It could drag in “journalists, politicians and private individuals [who] may argue passionately in favour of arming Ukraine in its war against Russia or returning the Elgin marbles” or anybody “advancing the interests of other states within the international pecking order” of their own volition.
Protesters could also be disproportionately affected by new police powers that “require individuals to leave areas adjacent to prohibited places” which include military bases, weapons sites, intelligence facilities and other crown land.
“There are insufficient safeguards built into the legislation to prevent unjustified incursions into public protest,” Hall said, and recommended that additional safeguards in the form of a code of practice for police be created.
#spying #laws #result #overreach #real #harm #review #security #counterterrorism