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<\/p>\nGabriel Hetland is the author of the book \u201cDemocracy on the Ground: Local Politics in Latin America\u2019s Left Turn.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
\u201cWhat we did<\/span> in Venezuela, I think, is the perfect, the perfect scenario,\u201d U.S. President Donald Trump told<\/a> the New York Times in a March 1 interview about his plans for war on Iran. Things have not gone as Trump hoped, to put it mildly. Trump\u2019s search for the Iranian Delcy Rodr\u00edguez \u2014 a regime insider willing to comply with U.S. demands, as Rodr\u00edguez has since she ascended from Venezuela\u2019s vice president to acting president following the January 3 U.S. attack on Venezuela and kidnapping of its president, Nicol\u00e1s Maduro \u2014 hit a snag when the U.S. and Israel killed most of the would-be successors to Ayatollah Khamenei in the opening days of the war. During a March 3 meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Trump told<\/a> reporters, \u201cMost of the people we had in mind are dead.\u201d (Trump omitted the crucial fact that the U.S. is to blame.)<\/p>\n As the war passes the four-week mark, it is abundantly clear Iran will not be the next Venezuela. Operation Absolute Resolve, the code name for the U.S. attack on Venezuela, was a spectacular success in tactical terms. The U.S. achieved its military aim of removing Maduro in just a few hours and suffered zero U.S. service member fatalities and only a handful of injuries, although the operation cost the lives of around 70 Venezuelans and 32 Cuban security forces. While this toll should not be minimized, it pales in comparison to the U.S.\u2013Israeli war on Iran, which as of mid-March has led to at least 3,000 deaths<\/a> in Iran, Lebanon, and beyond. In contrast to Trump\u2019s \u201cbrilliant operation<\/a>\u201d in Caracas, the war on Iran has exploded. Well over a dozen countries are now involved, and the war threatens to bring the global economy to a halt due to the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a pivotal passage for oil, liquid natural gas, fertilizer, and other crucial commodities.<\/p>\n As the world\u2019s eyes remain fixed on Iran, it is important to ask: What has the Venezuela model actually achieved in Venezuela? The short answer is a new form of colonialism in which Venezuela has lost its national sovereignty. Trump\u2019s pledge to \u201crun\u201d Venezuela, made in the hours after the January 3 attack, has not come to pass. The attack instead led to regime change without a change of regime, in which the U.S. removed Maduro but left his regime almost entirely intact. Trump has boasted of this fact, telling<\/a> the New York Times, \u201cEverybody\u2019s kept their job except two people,\u201d i.e., Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, both of whom have spent the past three months awaiting trial in a Brooklyn jail. The officials who now run Venezuela come directly from Maduro\u2019s administration: Rodr\u00edguez; her brother Jorge, who heads the National Assembly; and the minister of interior, Diosdado Cabello. In a possible sign of future changes to come, Rodr\u00edguez on March 18 replaced<\/a> Venezuela\u2019s longstanding minister of defense, Vladimir Padrino L\u00f3pez, all but surely in coordination with the U.S.<\/p>\n The flip side of this overall continuity is the Trump administration\u2019s stunning and continuing sidelining of far-right opposition leader Mar\u00eda Corina Machado, who won the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize and infamously gifted it to Trump<\/a> in an unsuccessful attempt to curry his favor. Trump has supported Rodr\u00edguez because she offers that which he most wants: stability. A handover to Machado threatened to plunge Venezuela into chaos and civil war. Strictly speaking, this is not because Machado \u201clacks the respect within\u201d Venezuela, as Trump claimed during his January 3 press conference. Polls indicate<\/a> Machado remains the most popular politician within Venezuela. The problem, for Trump, is Machado\u2019s longstanding opposition to any form of \u201ccollaboration\u201d with the Maduro administration and Chavismo (the political movement associated with the late Venezuelan President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez) more broadly. This radical stance makes Machado a major threat to Venezuela\u2019s military and state apparatus. Machado may be reevaluating her hardline position as she plans to return to Venezuela. In a March 12 press conference<\/a>, Machado spoke of a \u201cgrand national agreement,\u201d presumably a power-sharing accord, a possibility she had long rejected. Trump, for his part, has reportedly told<\/a> Machado, who fled the country in 2025, not<\/em> to return to Venezuela. This is purportedly out of concern for her safety but is more likely due to Trump\u2019s (not unreasonable) fear that Machado\u2019s presence in Venezuela would undermine the continuity Trump has sought to preserve.<\/p>\n For now, Venezuela remains in the hands of former Maduro officials, who have presided over a transformation of Venezuela\u2019s domestic and foreign policy that is both stunning and limited. The details of this transformation, and the way it is happening, lay bare Venezuela\u2019s profound lack of national sovereignty. While Trump is not \u201crunning\u201d Venezuela in an operational sense, the U.S. is now effectively dictating the country\u2019s policy. This is evident in many ways, starting with the fact that the Rodr\u00edguez administration must submit a monthly budget<\/a> to the U.S., which has the discretion to approve or reject Venezuela\u2019s requests. The Trump administration has also seized at least 80 million barrels<\/a> of Venezuelan oil and controls the sale of this oil, with the proceeds held not in Caracas but in a U.S. Treasury account<\/a> (prior to that, they were held in a U.S.-controlled account in Qatar). American Democratic Party leaders have repeatedly questioned<\/a> this arrangement, which is not only blatantly colonial and opaque but also creates the clear potential for corruption and malfeasance.<\/p>\n Under direct pressure from the Trump administration, Venezuela\u2019s National Assembly has implemented sweeping oil and mining reforms. In late January, the National Assembly passed a major reform of Venezuela\u2019s hydrocarbons law regulating oil production. The reform institutes three fundamental changes: First, it dramatically lowers the taxes and royalties foreign oil companies pay to the Venezuelan state. Under the 2006 hydrocarbons law, the Venezuelan state took up to 65 percent of oil proceeds. The reform permits this to be reduced<\/a> to 25 percent, lowers income taxes to 15 percent (from 30 percent), and caps royalties at 30 percent, with the executive given discretion to lower it even further. Second, the reform allows foreign oil companies to operate independently, instead of the previous mandate that foreign companies operate through joint projects with Venezuela\u2019s national oil company, PDVSA. Third, the reform allows arbitration over disputes to occur in foreign courts, eliminating the earlier requirement that disputes be resolved within Venezuela. These changes give foreign oil companies dramatically greater material benefits and control over the country\u2019s oil.<\/p>\n Foreign oil companies are already taking advantage. Shell and Chevron are reportedly close<\/a> to signing major new deals for production in Venezuela. Chevron is the only U.S. oil major that remained in Venezuela throughout the Hugo Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro years, with Shell (like Exxon and others) having left the country in the wake of the 2006\u20132007 nationalization process under Ch\u00e1vez. Despite these deals, it will take significant time and resources \u2014 upward of $100 billion<\/a> and a decade of work, according to experts \u2014 for Venezuela\u2019s oil industry to approach its previous levels of production. These latest deals come in the wake of the second recent visit by a Trump Cabinet member to Venezuela. Energy Secretary Chris Wright toured<\/a> Venezuela in mid-February, and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum traveled there<\/a> in early March, when he gushed about Washington\u2019s desire to access Venezuela\u2019s mineral resources. CIA Director John Ratcliffe and U.S. Southern Command General Francis Donovan have also recently traveled to Venezuela. During Burgum\u2019s visit, Rodr\u00edguez promised<\/a> to work at \u201cTrump speed\u201d to ramp up the U.S.\u2019s access to Venezuela\u2019s mineral resources. Rodr\u00edguez has been as good as her word, with the National Assembly swiftly moving<\/a> to approve a new mining law that, like the hydrocarbons reform, will roll back decades-old nationalist legislation.<\/p>\n The U.S. has also pushed Venezuela to sever its relations with its rivals China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba. A statement<\/a> from Venezuela\u2019s foreign ministry late last month about the U.S.\u2013Israeli war on Iran shows the profound changes underway. The statement (which was later taken down<\/a>) condemned Iran but failed to condemn or even name the U.S. or Israel. This is a major shift from the Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro years, when Venezuela stood with Iran and regularly condemned the U.S. and Israel. The change in Venezuela\u2019s foreign policy is most clear on Cuba, which for more than a decade relied heavily on highly subsidized Venezuelan oil. After Maduro\u2019s capture, Venezuela ceased all oil shipments to Cuba, directly contributing to the profound energy crisis<\/a> it is now facing, marked by regular nationwide blackouts. The Trump administration has done everything it can to deepen\u00a0this crisis by applying heavy pressure on Mexico and other countries to stop providing oil to Cuba. Trump\u2019s open goal is regime change.<\/p>\n While Venezuela\u2019s economic and foreign policy has shifted quickly and decisively, political change since Maduro\u2019s capture has been much more slow going. There is still no timetable for elections, and the Trump administration is not pushing for a democratic transition any time soon. According to a New York Times report<\/a>, Rubio and Rodr\u00edguez have discussed the possibility of holding elections in late 2027, and Rubio has made clear that there must be a new democratically elected government in Venezuela before Trump leaves office in 2029. Rodr\u00edguez has taken a few steps toward political liberalization. She has pledged to close<\/a> the notorious El Helicoide prison, and on February 19 the National Assembly passed<\/a> an amnesty law, which has been greeted as a positive development but criticized<\/a> for limiting the time period and offenses covered by the law. According to a March 17 report <\/a>by the Venezuelan human rights organization Foro Penal, as of February 24 the government had released over 400 political prisoners.<\/p>\n \u201cPeople don\u2019t care about the idea of sovereignty or nationhood when they\u2019re dying of hunger.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/figure>\n A key question is: How do ordinary Venezuelans feel about the changes happening in their country? One answer comes from the first in-person poll<\/a> conducted in Venezuela following Maduro\u2019s removal, with 1,000 respondents interviewed between January 24 and 30. The poll indicates Venezuelans largely support the January 3 operation and feel cautiously optimistic about the future but deeply unsatisfied with their economic situation and wary of the Rodr\u00edguez administration. Fifty-five percent of respondents approve of Maduro\u2019s removal and 77 percent view him unfavorably. Rodr\u00edguez fares a tad better, with 73 percent viewing her unfavorably, while 37 percent approve and 41 percent disapprove of her performance as acting president.\u00a0<\/p>\n This suggests many Venezuelans are in a wait-and-see holding pattern with Rodr\u00edguez. Tellingly, 62 percent of respondents list cost of living as their priority versus just 7 percent prioritizing democracy. The poll also indicates Venezuelans are evenly split in their views of the U.S. government and Trump, with roughly half supportive and half opposed. Of the respondents, 72 percent reported they feel Venezuela is moving in a positive direction and 83 percent feel optimistic about the future.<\/p>\n These findings are in line with recent public comments by Venezuelan scholars and journalists. In a February 3 online Atlantic Council forum<\/a>, Guillermo Aveledo, a political science professor at Universidad Metropolitana in Caracas, said most Venezuelans were feeling cautiously optimistic but continue to fear government repression. Aveledo also spoke of how citizens and the government will be testing the waters in the coming weeks and months to see what is acceptable in terms of public speech and protest.<\/p>\n During a March 11 interview I conducted with him, Andr\u00e9s Antillano, a member of the anti-imperialist leftist organization Corriente Comunes and professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, expressed a similar but more critical view. Antillano said, \u201cI believe Trump is more popular in Venezuela than in the United States,\u201d and added, \u201cthere\u2019s a consensus that what happened [on January 3] is for the better of the country.\u201d He noted, \u201cGovernment actors are happy because they\u2019ve preserved their power. The right is happy because Trump, their great hero, is ruling. And the people are happy because of their expectation \u2026 that their life conditions are going to improve.\u201d Antillano feels this is mistaken: \u201cNot only have we not seen an improvement but in material terms, in economic terms, the situation has gotten worse and worse.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Antillano views Venezuelans\u2019 continuing immiseration \u2014 due to years of government mismanagement and punishing U.S. sanctions (which Trump eased<\/a> on March 18, in a major policy shift allowing U.S. oil companies to deal directly with PDVSA, Venezuela\u2019s state-owned oil company) \u2014 as the reason for their acquiescence to Venezuela\u2019s subordination to the U.S.<\/p>\n \u201cPeople don\u2019t care about the idea of sovereignty or nationhood when they\u2019re dying of hunger,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n Antillano remains deeply pessimistic about Venezuela\u2019s future. \u201cWe are in a subordinate, colonial relationship. We\u2019re a protectorate,\u201d he said. He also said: \u201c[Machado] wants to return to the country to defend the idea of the political transition. Thus, we could see the great irony of Mar\u00eda Corina becoming the anti-imperialist figure and the Bolivarian government, with its anti-imperialist origins, becoming the great defender of Trump. It\u2019s crazy, very strange. Everything that\u2019s happening is very sad.\u201d<\/p>\n He continued: \u201cAs a friend told me, Venezuela has gone from being a laboratory for emancipatory practices to being a laboratory for the new colonialism.\u201d<\/p>\n <\/p>\n![\"A](\"https:\/\/theintercept.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/GettyImages-2263327862.jpg?fit=7453%2C4969\")
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