The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran\u2019s supreme leader, in March 2026 marks the end of a political era in the Middle Eastern country. Khamenei was killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran\u2019s capital, Tehran. This has triggered a war drawing in numerous countries across the Middle East.<\/p>\n
The Horn of Africa and Red Sea regions, which link Africa and the Middle East, share a dense web of military, political and economic interactions that enable crises on one shore to quickly affect the other. Here, Somalia, Eritrea, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti sit along one of the world\u2019s most important trade and geopolitical corridors.<\/p>\n
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World leaders urge swift end to Iran crisis after Khamenei death
Shipping lines cut routes, posing risk to trade flows
Shipping has collapsed through vital Strait of Hormuz<\/p>\n
But the consequences of Khamenei\u2019s death may be less dramatic than many expect. This is because power in Iran is dispersed across entrenched institutions and security elites who are capable of preserving regime continuity.<\/p>\n
The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea<\/strong><\/p>\n Iran is no stranger to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. During the 1990s and 2000s, Tehran established security and economic ties with several countries, notably Sudan, to gain a foothold along the Red Sea.<\/p>\n Iran\u2019s influence waned, however, during the 2010s as Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, increased their diplomatic, financial and military presence.<\/p>\n Read:\u00a0SA capturing a larger share\u00a0of diverted Red Sea marine\u00a0traffic [Sep 2025]<\/p>\n As a political scientist studying Middle Eastern and African security, I have followed Iran\u2019s regional engagement for years. From my perspective, events in Iran and the Gulf matter to African countries because conflicts, arms flows and rivalries can easily spill across shores in a single strategic region.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Three intertwined dynamics shape how Khamenei\u2019s death affects the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.<\/p>\n Firstly, Tehran\u2019s influence here has declined over the past decade. This is with the exception of Yemen, where Iran supports the Houthi movement, which has previously attacked Israeli-linked vessels.<\/p>\n ADVERTISEMENT<\/p>\n CONTINUE READING BELOW<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Secondly, the way this latest conflict was triggered and has escalated may be more important than a change in Iranian leadership. It could contribute to a broader erosion of moderation.<\/p>\n Thirdly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) \u2013 Iran\u2019s powerful military force \u2013 is set to play a pivotal role in the post-Khamenei transition.<\/p>\n This is significant for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Iran\u2019s engagement here has largely relied on unconventional methods. Naval manoeuvres are an example, such as the long-term deployment in the Red Sea of the Iranian vessel Saviz, which has served as a logistical and intelligence platform. The country has also deployed military advisers and established arms networks to transport Iranian weapons.<\/p>\n Any future leadership closely aligned with the IRGC is likely to keep using these low-cost tools.<\/p>\n In this sense, continuity will likely prevail over rupture. Iran\u2019s ambitions are filtered through a sober assessment of constraints that the ongoing war may entrench.<\/p>\n Iran\u2019s shifting priorities<\/strong><\/p>\n Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has considered itself a middle power with legitimate claims to regional pre-eminence. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa gradually became part of Iran\u2019s expanded strategic geography.<\/p>\n Following the consolidation of the regime promoted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei \u2013 who took over in 1989 after his predecessor\u2019s death \u2013 progressively translated Iran\u2019s ambition into strategic depth.<\/p>\n This aimed to extend Iran\u2019s security perimeter beyond its borders through alliances, proxies and low-cost commitments.<\/p>\n In the 2000s, Iran cultivated close ties with Sudan and Eritrea.<\/p>\n It established naval access points in the two countries and used soft power tools, such as development aid and religious networks. It considered the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which is between Yemen and Djibouti, vital for countering Saudi and Israeli influence and maintaining alternative trade routes.<\/p>\n The limitations of this expansion became apparent, however.<\/p>\n ADVERTISEMENT:<\/p>\n CONTINUE READING BELOW<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Iran\u2019s ambitions soon came up against reality. The country\u2019s economy was weakened by sanctions linked to its nuclear programme and US withdrawal from a 2015 nuclear deal.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Meanwhile, political power remained fragmented across competing institutions. Domestic pressures, including economic hardship and periodic protest movements, were mounting. Instability in neighbouring states such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen made long-term regional power projection costly and uncertain.<\/p>\n After 2015, Saudi Arabia increased its engagement in the Horn of Africa through financial aid, diplomatic pressure and military cooperation linked to the war in Yemen.<\/p>\n Seeking logistical support along the Red Sea and aiming to counter Iran\u2019s influence near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, Saudi Arabia strengthened its ties with regional governments. This prompted Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea to sever or scale back their relations with Tehran. They effectively aligned themselves with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Iran redirected resources to higher-priority theatres of war, such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen.<\/p>\n For a decade, therefore, Tehran\u2019s presence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea has become more selective and opportunistic. Iran has relied on indirect leverage there, such as Houthi operations, rather than direct expansion.<\/p>\n Khamenei\u2019s death is likely to reinforce rather than reverse the trend. In fact, the outcome of the current war and the start of a delicate succession process could prompt an even more cautious approach abroad.<\/p>\n Worsening fragility<\/strong><\/p>\n Although a change in Iranian leadership may not alter the approach to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the dynamics that led to the recent conflict may have an impact on the region.<\/p>\n The scale and visibility of the Israeli-US attack \u2013 and Iran\u2019s direct retaliation \u2013 signal something deeper: the erosion of thresholds in the use of force.<\/p>\n Iran is not buying time and avoiding direct confrontation while limiting the manoeuvre room of its rivals.<\/p>\n This could usher in a period of \u201canything goes\u201d.<\/p>\n Regional actors, from Gulf states to local governments, are likely to feel increasingly justified in bypassing established security norms. The Red Sea has already become a crowded arena. External powers are projecting their strength. Local states are exploiting competition among them. The reshuffling of forces triggered by the war in Iran will have repercussions throughout the region.<\/p>\n ADVERTISEMENT:<\/p>\n CONTINUE READING BELOW<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n In such a context, characterised by multiple hierarchies, even a reduction of Iranian capabilities could have knock-on effects.<\/p>\n The region\u2019s fragility \u2013 as seen in civil war in Sudan, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, instability in Somalia and the heavy presence of military bases along maritime routes \u2013 amplifies these risks.<\/p>\n In other words, the question is not whether Iran will suddenly expand into east Africa. It is whether the regional climate will shift towards fewer restrictions and greater acceptance of coercive tools.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n If escalation becomes normalised in the heart of the Middle East \u2013 the region\u2019s most interconnected theatre \u2013 the fallout could be felt in places like the Horn of Africa.<\/p>\n Uncertainty in the short term<\/strong><\/p>\n Khamenei\u2019s death is likely to generate uncertainty in the short term at the regional level, but will lead to continuity in the long term.<\/p>\n Over time, Tehran has adopted what can be termed a \u201crealist defence\u201d doctrine \u2013 deterrence through a strong indirect presence, but at reduced cost and risk.<\/p>\n Iran\u2019s view of international politics as a zero-sum game \u2013 where one actor\u2019s gain is another\u2019s loss \u2013 and its desire to reduce the influence of its rivals are not merely the result of personal legacies. Rather, they are deeply rooted in the country\u2019s identity.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n For the Horn of Africa, this means that Tehran is likely to remain a secondary but persistent player: active enough to hinder its rivals\u2019 strategies, yet restrained enough to avoid major commitments.<\/p>\n Federico Donelli<\/span>, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste.<\/em><\/p>\n This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.moneyweb.co.za\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/The-Horn-of-Africa-and-the-Red-Sea-555x467.png\")
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